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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- No. 10401 
JACK YOUNGLOVE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Jack Younglove, appeals from a determi-
nation under Title 77, Chapter 60, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, adjudicating him to be the father of the bastard child 
of Betty Wallberg. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with bastardy 
in violation of Section 77-60-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. It was alleged that on or about the 10th day of Febru-
;11y, 1964, Betty Wallberg, an unmarried female, became 
pregnant and that Jack Younglove, the appellant, was the 
father of the child subsequently born. Trial was held on 
March 22, 1965, before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
Judge, sitting with a jury. The appellant was found guilty 
of being th<" father of the bastard child of Betty Wallberg. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah submits that the adjudication of the 
appellant as the natural father of the child of Betty Wall-
berg should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts: 
Betty Wallberg, a widow with six prior children, met Jack 
Younglove on or about the 4th day of January, 1964, at the 
Ute Bar at South Temple and Second West streets in Salt 
Lake City ( R. 34) . Mrs. Wallberg was employed as a bar-
maid at the Ute Bar. She testified that she went out with 
Younglove approximately five days after she met him (R. 
34). Mrs. Wallberg testified that she had sexual inter-
course with the appellant several times during the month 
of January (R. 35). She further testified that she had her 
last menstral cycle from the 27th of January, 1964, until the 
first day of February, 1964, and thereafter, had no other 
menstral period until the birth of her child. Mrs. Wallberg 
indicated that she had sexual intercourse with Younglove 
several times during February of 1964 (R. 38). She stated 
that she had almost daily intercourse with the appellant 
between the 15th day of February and the 15th day of 
March, 1964 ( R. 38) . She testified that she did not engage 
in sexual intercourse with any other man during the same 
period or go out with any other male companion (R. 39) 
In November, 1964, Mrs. Wallberg gave birth to an eight 
pound six ounce baby boy ( R. 3 9--40) . 
On the 3rd or 4th of March, 1964, the appellant ac-
knowledged that Mrs. Wallberg had not had her mrnstral 
period. In July of 1964, the appellant and Mrs. Wallberg 
had a conversation wherein Younglove indicated that he 
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wantf'.d to make some arrangements to marry Mrs. Wall-
berg ( R. 45). Subsequently, in August of 1964, the appel-
lant learned that Mrs. Wallberg had obtained welfare and 
in<licated that because of that, he would deny paternity 
( R. 46) . At the time Mrs. Wall berg obtained welfare and 
entered the County Hospital to give birth to her child, she 
listed Jack Younglove as her husband and father of the 
child (R. 54). 
The appellant, Jack Younglove, testified that he was 
married and had three children. He admitted meeting 
Betty Wallberg on January 5, 1964, at the Ute Bar (R. 62). 
The appellant admitted taking Betty Wallberg home the 
first night he met her (R. 63). The appellant further ad-
mitted being in Salt Lake City from January 20, 1964, to 
the 2nd day of March, 1964, and returning to Salt Lake 
City on March 15, 1964, after having left the State (R. 64-
65). The appellant admitted taking Mrs. Wallberg home 
srveral times during the month of January, 1964, the last 
time being on January 20, 1964 ( R. 71). The appellant 
denied any discussions concerning marrying Mrs. Wall-
berg (R. 67). The appellant testified as to meeting Betty 
Wallberg in the Ute Bar, seeing her in the company of 
other men and taking her home on a number of occasions 
(R. 62, 63), and testifying further that he had helped her 
move on two occasions ( R. 70). On cross-examination, the 
appellant \Vas asked if he had ever had sexual intercourse 
\1ith Mrs. Wallberg on any of the nights he took her home. 
Thr appellant refused to answer on the grounds that it 
might incriminate and disgrace him (R. 72). The trial 
court overruled the objection and the appellant admitted 
having intercourse with Mrs. Wallberg in January of 1964 
on each occasion that he took her home (R. 75). 
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Based upon the above facts, the jury returned a verdict 
finding that the appellant was the father of the bastard 
child of Betty Wall berg. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
PROSECUTION TO QUESTION THE APPELLANT RE-
GARDING HIS BURGLARY CONVICTION. 
At the time of the appellant's trial and after his direct 
examination, the prosecution asked the following questiom 
of the appellant (R. 71): 
"Q (Mr. Winder) Have you ever been convicted of a 
felony, Mr. Younglove? 
A Yes. 
Q What felony? 
A Burglary. 
Q Where? 
A Salt Lake. 
Q The date of your conviction? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I object to that 
as irrelevant and material, the date of it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
MR. MARTINEAU: May I have an exception, h_c 
is trying to get in through the back door through this 
line of questions what he was unable to elicit with the 
other question. 
THE COURT: What is your answer? 
A Box 250, Draper, Utah. 
Q (Mr. Winder) What is the date you were com-
mitted or sentenced? 
A December 18, 1964." 
s 
The appellant contends that the above cross-examination 
was error, relying upon State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 
Pac. 909 (1930) and State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 
434 ( 1910). Neither of these cases support the appellant's 
position and substantial subsequent precedent from this 
court supports the trial court's ruling that the questions 
asked by the prosecution were proper under the circum-
stances. The appellant's contention is apparently that the 
prosecution asked the appellant the details and circum-
stances surrounding his conviction. This, of course, is not 
true at all. The only questions asked were the type of crime, 
where it occurred, and the date of the conviction. This is in 
no way going into the details and factual circumstances of 
the crime. In State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 Pac. 717 
( 1922), this court recognized that it was permissible to in-
quire as to the nature of the crime, whether it was burglary, 
larceny, etc. Numerous courts have upheld allowing the 
time and place of the conviction, since this is directly rele-
vant to determining the witness's present veracity. A crime 
many years prior may have little effect for impeachment 
purposes. McCormick, Evidence, p. 92 ( 1954); Hadley 
v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 Pac. 458 ( 1923). In State v. 
Hougenson, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), this court 
')bservecl that any witness may be asked on cross-examina-
tion whether he has been convicted of a felony. In State v. 
Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361P.2d412 ( 1961), this court stated: 
"The trial court properly indicated the view that the 
def encl ant could be questioned about such convictions 
and as to the number and type of crimes involved for 
the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a wit-
ness." 
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 ( 1963), this 
court observed: 
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"Also assigned as error is the cross-examination of the 
defendant as to convictions. It was elicited upon cro~s­
examination that the defendant had several prior 
felony convictions, unrelated to the instant charge, and 
he maintains that this amounted to a general assault 
upon his character and thus constituted prejudicial 
error. This is also without merit. When an accuscrl 
voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be askerl 
whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony. 
Such a question is sanctioned by statute. If thf' accused 
answers in the affirmative, he may be asked the natme 
of the felony. Further, the accused may be asked if he 
has been convicted of more than one felony, and if so, 
the type or nature thereof. 
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting the 
prosecution to question the accused regarding prim 
felony convictions is to affect his credibility as a witness. 
However, the details or circumstances surrounding thr 
felony or felonies for which the accused was convicted 
may not be inquired into except under unusual circum-
stances, when the inquiry would tend to show a scheme, 
plan, modus operandi, or the like. In the instant case. 
the details of the prior felony convictions were not 
asked of the defendant." 
Thus, it is apparent that the rule in Utah is that more may 
be inquired into than just a conviction of a felony and that 
the limiting provisions of the Vance case are no longer ap-
plicable. In the instant case, it is apparent that the ques-
tions of the prosecution did not exceed the bounds of pro-
priety and did not purport to go into the facts and detaib 
of the crime. The appellant was in no way prejudiced. Tl:e 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN COMPELLING THE 
APPELLANT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS RELATING TO 
WHETHER HE HAD HAD SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH 
THE rROSECUTRIX, WHERE HE WAS CHARGED WITH 
B\STARDY AND WHERE HE VOLUNTARILY TOOK THE 
STAND AND TESTIFIED TO ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE 
PROSECUTRIX AT THE TIME WHEN THE CONCEPTION 
WAS TO HA VE TAKEN PLACE. 
After the prosecution rested, the appellant voluntarily 
took the stand. He testified to meeting Mrs. Wallberg on 
January 5, 1964, at the Ute Bar and admitted taking her 
home on that night. The appellant further admitted being 
in Salt Lake City from January 20 to the 2nd day of March, 
1964, and thereafter, leaving for a short time and returning 
on March 15, 1964. The appellant admitted taking Betty 
Wallberg home several times and being in her company on 
numerous occasions. The appellant denied making any of 
the admissions Mrs. Wallberg claimed he made when she 
testified. The appellant also admitted helping Mrs. Wall-
berg move on two occasions. The whole scope of his testi-
mony involved the period between January 5, 1964, when 
he met Betty Wallberg, to the time of the birth of her baby. 
Although at no time on direct examination did the appel-
lant expressly deny being the father of Mrs. Wallberg's 
child, or having had intercourse with her, the nature of his 
testimony was such that implicit in it was a claim of inno-
:ence to the charge. No jury, had the case been left where 
11 was af1er the appellant had testified, could have con-
cludrcl nthenvise than that the appellant had denied his 
''.'
11 1t of the offense charged and his involvement with Mrs. 
\\ .:illherg, at kast to the extent that his being the father 
other basta1 cl child was in issue. 
The appellallt contends that since he did not expressly 
11
't
1fy on the is';ue of sexual intercourse he could not have 
8 
been compelled on cross-examination to testify, since this 
would violate his rights against self-incrimination. It is 
submitted that this proposition is without merit. 
FEDERAL CASES 
The appellant contends, and properly so, that since the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ( 1964), that the privileges existing 
under the Federal Constitution which allow a defendant in 
a criminal case to refuse to be compelled to give incriminat-
ing evidence are applicable to the State's. However, there 
is nothing in the Malloy case which indicates that where a 
defendant in a criminal or civil proceeding takes the stand 
and gives testimony on direct examination he may not be 
cross-examined into all aspects of the case. Indeed, the 
federal rule is exactly the opposite, as is the rule generally 
throughout the United States. McCormick, Evidence, page 
274 (1954) states: 
"An ordinary witness has no privilege to decline alto-
gether to testify and by taking the stand, he waives 
nothing. He has a choice only when he is asked an in-
criminating question. The accused is in a vastly dif-
ferent position. He has an option to stay off the stanrl 
altogether, or to testify. As his privilege is wider, so 
correspondingly his waiver is wider, than that of the 
ordinary witness who answers an incriminating ques-
tion. By volunteering to become a witness, he volun· 
teered to answer all relevant inquiries about the charge 
against him which is on trial." 
8 Wigmore, Evidence, McNaughton Revision, 1961, Sec· 
tion 2276, page 459 notes the same rule: 
"The case of an accused in a criminal trial who volun-
tarily takes the stand is a special case. Here, the pri,i-
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Jege has been construed t? protect h.im from bei1:1g re-
quired to answer even a smgle question* * *. His vol-
untary offer of testimony on any fact is a waiver as to 
all other relevant facts, because of the necessary con-
nection between all." 
The reason for the rule is clearly set forth in the same sec-
tion of Wigmore's work: 
"Any voluntary disclosure by the accused, except in the 
most unlikely situation, distorts the probative picture. 
The application of a rule of waiver to an accused, it 
should be noted, is at least as fair as its application to 
an ordinary witness. The accused has the choice at the 
outset, unhurried and with full knowledge that all 
questions will relate to his incrimination, whereas the 
ordinary witness is compelled to take the stand in the 
first instance and his opportunity for choice does not 
come until later when, perhaps by surprise and with-
out clear portent, some part of an incriminating fact is 
asked for. 
The result is, then, that the accused, as to all facts 
whatever (except those which merely impeach his 
credit and therefore are not directly related to the 
charge in issue) , has signified his waiver by the initial 
act of taking the stand. Moreover, the reasons ad-
vanced for the privilege ( ~ 2251 supra) are decisively 
less persuasive when applied to disclosures requested 
after the accused has voluntarily taken the stand." 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
rnher federal courts clearly support the statements made in 
~\'igmore and McCormick. See Rogge, The First and The 
hfth, page 194 ( 1960). 
, In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 180 ( 1887), the United 
Statrs Supreme Court recognized that when an accused 
takes the stand, he becomes subject to cross-examination on 
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all issues of relevance to the charges against him. Thr 
court stated: 
"We come now to consider the objection that the cle-
fendant Spies was compelled by the court to be a 11ir-
ness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself"' 
a witness in his own behalf, and by so doing, he became 
bound to submit to a proper cross-examination under 
the law and practiced in the jurisdiction where he 11a' 
being tried." 
Subsequently, in Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 30-! 
( 1900), the Supreme Court again passed upon the issue. 
The court stated: 
"Error is also assigned in not restricting the cross-exam-
ina tion of the plaintiff in error. Defrndant himself 
was the only witness put upon the stand by the defense, 
who was connected with the transaction; and he 1rns 
asked but a single question, and that related to his 
whereabouts upon the night of the murder. To this h~ 
answered: 'I was up between Clancy's and Kennedy's. 
I had been in Clancy's up to about half-past twelve 01 
one o'clock-about one o'clock, I guess. I went up to 
Kennedy's and had a few drinks with Captain Wallace 
and Billy Kennedy, and I told them I was getting kind 
of full and I was going home, and along about quarter 
past one Wallace brought me down about as far as 
Clancy's and then he took me down to the cabin and 
left me in the cabin, and we wound the alarmclorkaml 
set it to go off at six o'clock, and I took off my shoes and 
lay down on the bunk and woke up at six o'clock in the 
morning, and went up the street.' 
' I 
On cross-examination the government wa.~ pcrrrnw·u 
over the objection of defendant's counsel, to ask qur<-
tions relating to the witness's attire on the night uf the 
shooting, to his acquaintance with Corbett, '' h_rtk: 
Corbett had shoes of a certain kind, whether witrn''' 
11 
saw Corbett on the evening of March 12, the night p~e­
ceding the shooting, w~ethe: Corbett roomed. with 
Fitzpatrick in the latter s cabm, and whether witness 
say any one else in the cabin besides Brooks and 
Corbett. The court permitted this upon the theory 
that it was competent for the prosecution to show every 
movement of the prisoner during the night, the char-
acter of his dress, the places he had visited and the 
company he had kept. 
Where an accused party waives his constitutional 
privilege of silence, takes the stand in his own behalf 
and makes his own statement, it is clear that the 
prosecution has a right to cross-examine him upon such 
statement with the same latitude as would be exercised 
in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the circum-
stances conecting him with the alleged crime." 
In Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 ( 1912), the 
United States Supreme Court observed: 
"Thus, if the witness, himself, elects to waive his privi-
lege, as he may doubtless do, his privilege is for his pro-
tection and not for that of other parties and discloses 
his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, 
but must go on and make a full disclosure." (citing 
numerous cases) 
In Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943), Mr. 
.lustice Douglas, speaking for the court, stated: 
''The case of an accused who voluntarily takes the stand 
and the case of an accused who refrains from testifying 
!Bruno v. United States 308 US 287 84 Led 257 60 s c 9 ' ' ' , , t 1 8) are of course vastly different. Raff el v. ~;11 \ed States, 271 US 494, yo Led 1054, 46 S Ct ~66 . 
. ~ \o]untary offer of testimony upon any fact is a 
"aiver as to all other relevant facts, because of the 
necessary connection between all.' 8 Wigmore Evi-
cle11ce. '.-ld ed. 1940, ~ 2276(2). And see Fitzp~trick 
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v. United States, 178 US 304, 315, 316, 44 L cd Jr:. 
1083, 1084, 20 S Ct 944; Powers v. United Sta tr' n: 
US 303, 314, 56 Led 448, 452, 32 S Ct 281." , --
See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 ( 1951 ). 
Numerous lesser federal courts have, of course, foll011rd 
the Supreme Court's direction. In Caminetti v. Unitcd 
States, 220 F. 545 (9th Cir. 1915), aff'd 242 U.S. 4/ii 
( 1915), the defendant took the stand and testified onh tn 
part of the facts which were in the nature incriminatin~ 
and then refused to go further. It was determined that k 
failure to go further operated as a waiver so far as his pri1.i-
lege to have the prosecution refrain from commenting upo11 
his failure to explain various facts. Numerous cases at· 
cited in Wigmore, supra, Section 2276, from both state anti 
federal jurisdictions, supporting the above rule. A similct 
position has been taken under the Uniform Rules of fo 
dence, Rule 25 ( g). Certainly, therefore, under the gencr.1: 
rule of federal law, the appellant having taken the stanrl 
and testified on his own behalf was subject to cross-exami-
nation on all issues relevant to the charges against him 
Further, the appellant made incriminating statemfrtt' 
when he acknowledged being with the prosecuting fem;ilc 
in January of 1965 and admitted taking her home, sinC' 
according to Mrs. vVallberg, many of the acts of sc\nal 
intercourse took place in the parking lot adjacent to h··r 
apartment. By not allowing full cross-examination, th• 
jury could only be mislead because of the nature of ih·· 
appellant's testimony to the whole picture of his guilt. 
FEDERAL CASES (Cited by Appellant) 
The appellant in his brief has cited several cases fro~ the 
. d 1 f d 1 J·unsdic-Umted States Supreme Court an owcr c era 
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tiun' for the proposition that an accused taking the stand 
,1 ho does not testify as to incriminating facts cannot be 
cross-examined into facts which may tend to incriminate 
him. The cases cited by the appellant in no way support 
the proposition which appellant urges. Emspak v. United 
States. 349 U.S. 190 ( 1955) involved a situation where a 
Jahor union official was summoned to testify before a con-
gressional investigating committee and involved the ques-
tion of waiver of the privilege of self-incrimination before 
th~t committee. This is a substantially different situation 
than where an accused in a criminal trial voluntarily takes 
the stand. 
Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1961), 
involved a proceeding before the District Director of Im-
migration and Naturalization for enforcement of an admin-
istrative subpoena. The witness who testified was not the 
witness under investigation but an informative witness for 
tl1t purposes of the inquiry. Further, the court ruled that 
since the witness was unfamiliar with the nature of the pro-
cmlings, he could not have waived his right to self-incrimi-
uation. The case has no precedent in the instant fact situa-
tion. 
Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1958), 
in\'olvcd a case where a witness was called before a grand 
jury investigation. It did not involve a situation where a 
rl~frnclant in a criminal trial takes the stand in his own 
behalf. 
In United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3rd Cir. 1949), 
the is,ue rai5ed was of a witness not the accused testifying 
<\S to incriminating facts. This case is of no precedential 
:· ahi:' in thr case of an accused voluntarily taking the stand 
l!1 Ins own behalf \Vigmore supra Section 2276 · Mc-
(' '. ' ' ' ' ~urrnJCk. supra, page 274. 
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Finally, the appellant cites the case of the Uniter/ Stair· 
v. Hoag, 142 F. Supp. 667 (D. C. 1956). ThatcisrdL· 
involved a refusal to testify before a Senate permanent ~ub 
committee on investigation and is irrelevant to the instant 
case. Therefore, not one of the cases cited by the appellant 
supports the proposition for which it was urged. 
UTAH CASES 
The appellant seeks to draw special comfort from thr 
Utah statutes and cases. It is admitted, of course, that the 
Utah Constitution contains a provision prohibiting com· 
pelling a defendant to give evidence against himself. Articlr 
I, Section 12, Constitution of the State of Utah. Section 
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that an 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence again11 
himself, and Section 77-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 11111 
provides that a witness need not give an answer to a ques-
tion which will have a tendency to subject him to punish-
ment for a felony or degrade his character, unless it is t~r 
very fact in issue. In the instant case, of course, the appc1· 
lant's paternity is the very fact in issue. 
The appellant seeks to rely upon State v. Shorklc)', ~9 
Utah 25, 80 Pac. 865 ( 1905); State v. Vana, 38 Utah I. 
110 Pac. 434 (1910); State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, Jli 
Pac. 58 ( 1911). Appellant has also cited other Utah Gl"'i 
the relevance of which is doubtful, as will be demonstrattil 
The case of State v. Shockley, supra, is not in point ll'idi 
the instant case. In the Shockley case, the court held·' 
reversable error to permit the State to question the ddrnd· 
ant on cross-examination respecting the commission Ly him 
of other crimes in no wise connected with the crime foi 
which he was on trial. 
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Jn thr case of State v. Vance, supra, the defendant was 
·:hargccl with three counts of murder joined together. The 
special fact situation surrounding the alleged murder which 
11 as joined in three duplicitous counts is important to under-
standing the rnling of the court on appeal. The defendant 
was charged with killing his wife ( 1) by beating, kicking 
and bruising and ( 2) by poison. Further, he was charged 
11ith killing his wife by poison and beating, bruising and 
kicking her. At the time of trial, the defendant took the 
,(and and testified only with reference to the poisoning. No 
cvidmce of any kind was given relating to any beating or 
kicking. On cross-examination, the prosecutor was allowed 
to go into the issue of the kicking or beating. The Vance case 
discusses the scope of cross-examination more with refer-
encP to that rule prohibiting examination beyond direct 
testimony than it does the constitutional issue, which is 
raised before the court in the instant appeal. In any event, 
the court felt that there was sufficient facts where the de-
frndant testified with reference to the poison in the house 
to allow full inquiry on cross-examination into the question 
of tbe use of poison. On the issue of the beating, the court 
noted: 
"Appellant had neither directly or indirectly denied, 
~1or ,i,n any way negatived his connection with the beat-
mg. 
Th(' Va nee case, to the extent that it indicates that the 
majority rule, prohibits inquiry of a defendant on the basis 
ul self-incrimination beyond the specific matter testified to 
'Jn direct examination is in error, Wigmore, supra. To the 
rxtFrH that the Va nee case acknowledges California au-
r1 · 
•.tel) 111 "'supporting its position, it is equally in error. (See 
Pirplr v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764; People v. 
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Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505), nor" as tlir ruk 
different at the time the Vance case was decided. ,\;\('(, \\'ir:. 
more, supra, Section 2276. What the Vance case sPems to 
be saying is that cross-examination of a ddrnclant cannot 
exceed the scope of direct examination. Further, since thr 
defendant in the instant case most certainly indirC'cth 
denied his association with the crime chargf'.d ( 1) by lcJ1· 
ing in the jury's mind the implication that he clid not ha11, 
intercourse with Mrs. Wallberg during his association 11ith 
her and ( 2) in denying the admissions that l\lrs. Wallbf1~ 
testified the defendant made, it is apparent that e\'en undu 
the Vance rule, the defendant could be cross-examined as 
was done in this case. 
In State v. Thorne, supra, this court stated: 
"The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that a clcfrndant 
in a criminal case, becoming a witness, may he cro1i· 
examined the same as any other \vitness. He, like an; 
other witness, may be asked many q11C'.stions 11holil 
irrelevant and collateral to the issue, for the purpo1r· 
of testing his memory, affecting his creclibilitv, and th1 
weight of his testimony. When a question is asked 
which relates to incriminating acts, or calls for en 
dence of an incriminating character, separate and d11· 
tinct from those on trial or testified to bv him. he, lih 
any other \vitncss, may claim the privilc_ge and dcclinr , 
to answer it." 
The key phrase "separate and distinct from thoc;c on trial' 
makes it obvious that the Thorne case does not support tl 11• 
narrow proposition urged for it by the ap1wllant. Th 11 '· 
under the rule of State v. Thorne, supra, the ruling of the 
trial court in the instant case was clearly proper. 
h · ocjJ•lj
01 T e case of Sadlczr v. Young, 97 Utah 29 I. o 1 · r '' 
( 1938), cited in the appellant's brief, docs not ~upport ii" 
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proposition m.~crl for reversal. That case ~eld that a ~rose­
cutina \1·itness could not be asked questions about mter-,., 
comse with the clefrnclant on dates other than that charged 
:n thr information, since to do so would be to violate her 
pri\·ilege against self-incrimination. This is a distinct propo-
sition from thr question of the defendant's privilege when 
hr takes the stand ancl testifies on the very fact in issue. 
State y Reese, 41 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270 ( 1913), also 
cited by the appellant, is not relevant to the issue now before 
the court, since that case dealt with a "witness's" right to be 
fret' from degrading questions. The case now on appeal in-
voh'rs the appellant's right not to be compelled to give evi-
dence agamst himself. 
The brtter reasoned cases hold that in bastardy proceed-
ings a party or other witness who testifies without invoking 
the pri\·ilege against self-incrimination waives his constitu-
tional rights, 72 A.L.R.2cl 852. 
In Norfolk v. Ga)'lord, 28 Conn. 309 ( 1859), the Con-
necticut Supreme Court ruled that where the defendant in 
a bastarclv suit gave evidence in chief indicating that he had 
no illicit intercourse with the mother of the child he was 
' bound to answer every inquiry relating to the subject in 
issue on cross-examination. The court stated: 
":\ witne-;s is not to be compelled to testify to any matter, 
when his testimony may expose him to a criminal 
~har~e or prnal liability. But if he voluntarily testifies 
m ch 1ef, hr \\ aives his privilege, and must submit to 
the. consequent cross-examination, however penal in 
their co11sequC'nces his answers may become***. The 
rrason of the rule and its limitation is too obvious to 
rcquirr ducidation.'' 
. It \ionlcl be a mockrry of justice for the defendant to be 
~,\kJ\\rd lo tak th I · · h 1 f · · - ' c e stanc, give testimony, t eon y air im-
18 
plication of which is that he was not guilty of thr charges 
against him, and then, when subjected to cross-examina-
tion, he allowed to stand upon a privilege against self. 
incrimination. The rule simply does not sustain the appel-
lant's position; neither does reason nor logic. U ncler these 
circumstances, it is apparent that the appellant has no bas~ 
for relief from the judgment imposed against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was given a full and fair hearing in the 
trial court and determined to be the father of the illigiti· 
mate child of Betty Wallberg. The contentions raised on 
appeal are at best without merit. The prosecutor's cross· 
examination of the appellant concerning his conviction of 
a felony was proper, and the scope of cross-examination did 
not exceed the bounds of propriety. The appellant's asser· 
tion that his constitutional rights against self-incrimination 
were violated is obviously not supported by federal or state 
case law. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
